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It is universally accepted that in the economic battle of a strike each
individual striking employee must bear the temporary loss of his
income, subject to any assistance his union can give him in the form
of strike pay. It is not, however, universally accepted that he should
be penalized by losing his job and accrued claims to seniority and
fringe benefits such as pension, severance pay, sick pay, vacations
and holidays. This is particularly so in the case of a legal strike. The
legal striker is, after all, merely a participant, and perhaps not even
a willing participant, in the system espoused by labour relations law
for settling the terms and conditions of employment. The full extent
of the legal protections against such losses has received little
attention in Canada, probably because most unions win reinstate-
ment and "no-victimization" as part of any strike settlement. Such
is not always the case, however, and where the. union is weak and
loses badly, the individual striking employees may be in jeopardy.
It is with such employees that this paper is concerned.
After identifying more fully the employment interests threatened
in a strike and considering the justification for protecting such
interests, the law relating, first, to loss of job and, second, to loss of
fringe benefits is examined in detail with suggestions as to how it
should be reformed.
II. The Cause of the Problem: Expiry of the Collective Agreement
Canada has opted for a system of collective bargaining which
embodies a rigid distinction between conflicts of right and interest
and emphasizes the legal enforcement of the collective agreement
through arbitration. 1 For a strike to be lawful the collective
agreement, a subsequent process of conciliation and a waiting
*G. England, Lecturer in Law, University of Wales, U.W.I.S.T., Cardiff.
1. The best account is in H. Woods, Labour Policy in Canada (Toronto:
Macmillan, 1973).
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period must have expired, and when they do all that remains of the
employment relationship is the bare skeleton of the employment
contract fixing the wage/work bargain, which the employer is free
to renegotiate by individual "bargaining" with his employees.2 To
the extent that he can give them notice of termination unencumbered
by the "just cause" requirement of the collective agreement job
security and fringe benefits are threatened.
Until the recent Supreme Court of Canada decision in McGavin
Toastmasters v. Ainscoughs the effect of a strike on the individual
employment contract had received relatively little attention in
Canada. The more fully elaborated English jurisprudence is,
therefore, worth considering as a starting point, although the
statutory framework of Canadian labour law renders much of the
English contractual analysis inapplicable.
Analysts of the English law suggest that striking may have one of
three effects on the employment contract.4 The first suggestion is
that the strike constitutes repudiation by the employee in which case
he is liable to summary dismissal either when strike notice is given
(treating the notice as an anticipatory breach) or at any time after the
beginning of the strike on the theory that there is a fresh repudiation
of his contract on each successive day the employee is absent. 5
Second, it is suggested that the strike constitutes an express or
implied termination. In other words, the striker is treated as
resigning when the strike begins and is no better off than under the
first suggestion. Either way, the employer may refuse to re-engage
him under a new contract when the strike ends. The third suggestion
2 Under labour relations legislation in most Canadian jurisdictions the terms and
conditions of employment under a collective agreement are "frozen" for the
duration of the conciliation process and waiting period which must precede a legal
strike. At the same time it becomes lawful to strike, the "freeze" lifts. See infra,
note 73. The union which was party to the agreement will still have the exclusive
right to bargain collectively with the employer, and may have some obligation to
"bargain in good faith", but that does not prevent him from dealing individually
with his employees.
3. (1975), 54 D.L.R. (3d) 1; 75 C.L.L.C. 15, 253 (S.C.C.).
4. See P. O'Higgins, Legal Effect of Strike Notice (1968), 26 Camb. L.J. 223; K.
Foster, Strikes and Employment Contracts (1971), 34 Mod. L. Rev. 275; N.
Lewis, Strikes and the Contract of Employment, [1968] J. Bus. L. 24. See also
Chappell v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [1975] I.C.R. 145 (C.A.), noted by R.
Simpson, The Impact on Industrial Law of Chappell v. Times Newspapers Ltd.
(1975), 49 Aust. L. J. 581. Limited protection against dismissal is afforded by the
Trade Union and Labour Relations Act, 1974, c. 52, Schedule 1, para. 8 as am. by
the Employment Protection Act 1976.
5. Smithies v. NAOP, [1909] 1 K.B. 310 at 335 (C.A.).
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is that the contract of employment is merely suspended. The
contractual nexus is preserved throughout the strike but the
obligation to work and to pay wages (and perhaps other obligations
as well) are suspended and, presumably, the employer's right to
terminate by proper notice or wages in lieu thereof is also
suspended, at least where his motive is to penalize strikers. On this
view job protection is guaranteed.
The English courts have, in fact, adopted the first suggestion, the
repudiation view of the law, except in cases where a strike notice
has been held to constitute an express resignation or where the
suspension doctrine has been held to have been expressly consented
to by the parites. 6 With one exception, 7 English judges have
rejected any suggestion that as a matter of public policy the
suspension doctrine should be held to be incorporated in the contract
of employment generally. They have thereby ignored the reality that
strikes are an accepted incident of the continuing collective
bargaining relationship between employer and employee.
In contrast the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in the
Ainscough8 case establishes that in Canada striking employees do
continue to be employees even where the strike is illegal. They are
therefore protected against victimization, to some degree at least, by
statutory provisions common to all Canadian jurisdictions which
substitute the collective agreement and legislated rights for the often
nebulous terms of a private contract of employment.
The facts in Ainscough were that the work force went on an
illegal strike during the subsistence of a collective agreement to
force negotiations over a planned discontinuance of part of the
employer's bakery operations. The union did not notify the
employer of the strike, and shortly after it began, the secretary of
the union was advised that the plant had closed down. Article XX of
the collective agreement entitled "full time employees" to
severance pay, but the employer refused to make such payments on
three grounds: that the strike meant that there was no "closure of the
plant" within Article XX; that even if there had been a closure the
strikers were disentitled because by striking illegally they had
automatically terminated their contracts of employment prior to the
6. Suspension presumably applies where strikes occur after compliance with an
incorporated procedure under s. 18(4). Trade Union and Labour Relations Act
1974. c. 52 (U.K.).
7. Morgan v. Fry, [1968] 3 All E.R. 452 (C.A.) (per Lord Denning M.R.).
8. (1975), 54 D.L.R. (3d) 1 ;75 C.L.L.C. 15, 253.
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closure or that by striking illegally the employees had repudiated
their contracts, which entitled the employer to terminate them. The
first ground was unanimously rejected at trial, in the Appeal Court
and in the Supreme Court of Canada. "Closure" was interpreted as
referring to closure by the employer, and that was what had
occurred. Opinions differed on the other grounds.
Kirke-Smith J. at first instance, 9 Robertson J.A. in the Court of
Appeal, 10 and de Grandpr6 J. in his dissent in the Supreme Court of
Canada 1 accepted the "repudiation" analysis, although de
Grandpr6 J. alone thought, on the facts, that the strikers'
repudiation had been accepted by the employer. McFarlane and
Seaton JJ.A., in the Court of Appeal, held the strike to be a
non-repudiatory breach of contract giving rise to damages only. 12 In
the Supreme Court of Canada, Laskin C.J.C., for the majority,
rejected any such contractual analysis of the employees' rights. He
said: 13
I do not think that in the face of labour relations legislation such
as existed at the material time in British Columbia, in the face of
the certification of the union, of which the plaintiffs were
members, as bargaining agent of the specified unit of employees
of the company and in the face of the collective agreement in
force between the union and the appellant company, it is possible
to speak of individual contracts of employment and to treat the
collective agreement as a mere appendage of individual
relationships....
The common law as it applies to individual employment
contracts is no longer relevant to employer-employee relations
governed by a collective agreement which, as the one involved
here, deals with discharge, termination of employment, sever-
ance pay and a host of other matters that have been negotiated
between union and company as the principal parties thereto ...
On this analysis it is submitted that under Canadian law the jobs
of striking employees are protected. If the strike is illegal as
9. (1973), 36 D.L.R. (3d) 309 at 314 (B.C.S.C.).
10. (1974), 45 D.L.R. (3d) 687 at 698-705 (B.C.C.A.). Only he accepted the third
ground, which is odd since he also thought that the repudiation had not been
accepted as terminating the contracts. Surely refusal to perform further constitutes
such an acceptance. See Seaton J.A. at 710-11.
11. (1975), 54 D.L.R. (3d) 1 at 9; 75 C.L.L.C. 15, 253 at 15, 257.
12. Damages are assessed at the value of each striker's own output less expense
incurred in obtaining it, which are too small to make suing practical. See Ebbw
Vale Steel, Iron and Coal Co. v. Tew (1935), 1 L.J. N.C.C.A. 284 (C.A.); NCB v.
Galley, [1958] I All E.R. 91 (C.A.).
13. (1975), 54 D.L.R. (3d) I at 5-6; 75 C.L.L.C. 15, 253 at 15, 256.
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occurring during a collective agreement, the contractual nexus
remains intact so the requirement of "just cause" for dismissal
under the agreement can be invoked. If the strike is legal, it is
submitted that under the labour legislation of each Canadian
jurisdiction there is statutory preservation of "employee" status
which parallels the doctrine of suspension at common law. Where a
strike is illegal because it occurs after the end of the collective
agreement but before the exhaustion of statutory peace procedures
the doctrine of suspension may have to be resorted to.
There are practical constraints as well on the power of employers
to penalize striking employees. 14 The union may win the strike and
secure reinstatement and "no-victimization" in the settlement
(these are invariably bargaining priorities). Even if it loses, the
labour market may force employers to retain the services of the
employees; for example, where the market is "tight", or where the
work force is large or relatively high-skilled. Further, employers do
not want to "sour" future relations with their workers or a defeated
union by taking a hard line. Thus the doubts about the legal position
of participants in an illegal strike cause no problem for the strong,
but where the union is defeated and there are no labour market
constraints the legal protection is essential. The "weak" must not
suffer injustice because of their weakness.
Even if the union wins the strike, it must ensure that the
"no-victimization" clause is properly worded to avoid two pitfalls.
First, it must specify that benefits accruing under the pre-strike
agreement remain enforceable under the new one. Arbitrators'
jurisdiction is limited to disputes arising from the agreement under
which they are appointed, so that they can only hear grievances over
benefits under the pre-strike agreement if the benefits are expressly
preserved 15 in the new one. Second, in order to protect benefits in
the hiatus between two agreements, the new agreement must
contain a retroactivity clause providing that obligations under the
pre-strike agreement are considered to have remained in force
through the hiatus. 1
6
14. See Royal Commission Inquiry into Labour Disputes (Toronto: Queen's
Printer, 1968) at 178 - "The Rand Report".
15. Re USW and Int'l. Nickel Ltd. (1970), 22 L.A.C. 286 (Weatherhill); Int'l.
BEW Local 579 and Berlet Electronics Ltd. (1968), 19 L.A.C. 152 (Weatherhill);
Re UAW and Canadian Acme Screw and Gear Ltd. (1964), 15 L.A.C. 351 at
362-63 (Little); Re Sudbury Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers Union and
Falconbridge Nickel Mines Ltd. (1958), 9 L.A.C. 105 (Little).
16. Re UAW Local 458 and Massey Ferguson Inds. Ltd. (1966), 17 L.A.C. 396
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IlI. Justifications for Protecting Employment Interests of Strikers
The justification for protecting strikers' employment interests must
be considered from the viewpoints of the worker, his union and the
"public interest".
For the worker, three considerations make it unfair that he lose
his job and fringe benefits for striking. First, the strike may be a
necessary component of the prevailing industrial relations system
from which society benefits; second, the strike may be lawful
vis-a-vis the union; third, the striker may have no practical option
but to strike.
Canada has opted for collective bargaining as the chief institution
of job regulation and a meaningful "right" to strike is essential for
its existence. Societal values will determine the limits of the
"right" to strike required to give any collective bargaining system
its driving force, but once it is determined that a particular kind of
strike is a necessary component of the system it is illogical and
unjust to penalize any individual striker for participating. He should
not bear the burden for action that is essential to the functioning of
the society in which he finds himself and from which the public
derives the benefits.
Second, if the union strikes lawfully it is illogical and inequitable
that the same activity should be treated as unlawful on the part of the
individual. The collectivity is the sum of its members. This should
not prevent employers from terminating the employment of strikers
by notice or wages in lieu thereof at common law but the law should
at least require that the striker not be treated as having acted
unlawfully in breach of contract when the strike is lawful on the
collective plane.
Third, workers are under strong pressures to join strikes,
including social ostracism, violence and expulsion from the union
with loss of job in a union shop. The striker has no practical
freedom of choice. He is faced with losing his job through striking
or being driven from it by his workmates. This would not justify
protecting strikers' jobs in all strikes but it is a reality weighing in
(Little); Re Int'l. Chemical Workers, Local 412, and Penick Canada Ltd. (1966),
17 L.A.C. 296 (Weatherhill); Re Service Employees' Union, Local 204, and
Toronto Hospital for Tuberculosis (1970), 22 L.A.C. 119 (Brown); Re Truck
Crane Services Ltd. and Int'l. Operating Engineers, Local 793 (1973), 4 L.A.C.
(2d) 250 (O'Shea); Re Sturgeon General Hospital and CUPE, Local 1335 (1974),
6 L.A.C. (2d) 360 (Taylor).
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favour of protecting them where the strike action is contemplated as
part of the functioning of the collective bargaining system.
For the union, to penalize its members is to commensurately
reduce its bargaining power. While the desirable point of balance in
the scales of bargaining power is a value judgment, it is nonetheless
unjust and illogical to allow the union to strike lawfully when the
same conduct is unlawful on the individual plane. This is to take
away with one hand what the other gives! Moreover, given that the
lawful strike is an essential component of the system, public policy
should require that the union be allowed to conduct it effectively
without having its position undercut on the individual level.
From the point of view of the "public interest", the lawful strike
must be regarded as the power house of the industrial relations
system from which society benefits. To permit the dismissal of
those who participate in lawful strikes is destructive of the system
and inconsistent with the public policy of promoting collective
bargaining. The argument that laws protecting strikers would tip the
balance of power too far in favour of employees and so destroy the
effective countervailing power of management should be rejected. It
erroneously assumes the present balance to be an absolute, whereas
in fact it varies with circumstances and fluctuates daily. Indeed, to
protect the job rights of individual employees would not augment
the power of "strong" unions since their strength already appears to
be protection enough for their members. It is the "weak" unions
who suffer along with their individual members and because of their
weakness effective collective bargaining may be severely impaired.
Thus the promotion of sound collective bargaining in areas of union
weakness would be assisted by protecting the jobs of individual
strikers, and this is in the "public interest".
Any legislation providing such protection must be based on
assessments of, first, which strikes are essential to the functioning
of the system and, second, how it is to be determined when the
worker is participating in them.
IV. Protections against Loss of Job
In all Canadian jurisdictions reliance is placed on legislation to
protect the jobs of strikers. It is consistent with the Canadian system
that protection be introduced by positive statutory intervention
since the acceptance of a high degree of legal intervention by
employers and unions in their affairs is part of the "common
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ideology" giving the system its unity, coherence and stability. 17
The terminological differences are examined later.18 The common
characteristic of the legislation in every Canadian jurisdiction is to
give protection through two separate provisions. First, there are
declaratory sections conferring "employee" status on strikers,
which assure access to the enforcement sections where none might
otherwise exist at common law. For example s. 1(2) of the Ontario
Act provides:
For the purposes of this Act, no person shall be deemed to have
ceased to be an employee by reason only of his ceasing to work
for his employer as the result of a. . . strike. 19
Second, there are enforcement sections making it an unfair labour
practice to discharge employees for taking part in lawful strikes.
Section 58 of the Ontario Act provides:
No employer . . . (a) shall refuse to employ or continue to
employ a person. . . because that person. . . was exercising any
. . . rights under this Act . . . or (b) shall seek by threat of
dismissal . . . to compel an employee . . . to cease to exercise
any... rights under this Act.
Although the section speaks of "person", he must be an
"employee" in order to be "employed". Section 1(2) therefore
complements s. 58 by ensuring that strikers have "employee"
status at the date of dismissal. 20 Since the Supreme Court of Canada
in Royal York held participating in a lawful strike to be a "right
under this Act", dismissal for lawful striking is prohibited. 21
1. The Ambit of Legitimate Action: Which Strikes?
Canadian public policy as expressed in labour relations legislation
permits striking only in the narrow confines of interest disputes after
the expiry of the collective agrement and relevant statutory peace
procedures. The enforcement sections have been interpreted to limit
the individual's protection to the same area. The landmark case is
CPR v. Zambri, known as the Royal York case.2 2 The sole question
17. J. Dunlop, Industrial Relations Systems (New York: Holt, 1958) at 16-18.
18. Infra at 448.
19. The Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 232.
20. "Employee" status is also required for the specific rights to reinstatement in
the Ontario and Manitoba Acts. Infra at 453-54.
21. CPR v. Zanbri (Royal York) (1962), 34 D.L.R. (2d) 654 (S.C.C.), aff g. (sub
non. R. v. CPR) 33 D.L.R. (2d) 30 (Ont. C.A.), affg. 31 D.L.R. (2d) 209 (Ont.
H. C.), rev'g. 61 C.L.L.C. 15,732 (Mag. Ct.).
22. Id. and see generally H. Arthurs, "The Right to Strike in Ontario and the
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was whether a strike called in compliance with statutory procedures
was a "right under this Act" within what is now s. 58(a) and (c) of
the Ontario Act.2 3 Magistrate Ellmore held that the term "right" in
the statute referred to a common law "right"; that the right to strike
had to be determined at common law irrespective of legislation and
that there was no such right. In the Supreme Court of Ontario,
however, McRuer C.J.H.C. re-affirmed the supremacy of legisla-
tion. He held that the statute, while not creating a "right" to strike
(which ultimately had its source in common law) did give the status
of employee to persons lawfully on strike, quite apart from the
common law. This was followed in the Appeal Court and the
Supreme Court of Canada upheld the decision on two lines of
reasoning.
Judson J. (Abbott and Martland JJ. concurring) held that striking
is a "right under this Act" wherever the statutory procedures are
complied with irrespective of common law.2 4 Locke J. followed
this approach, 25 which denies any role for common law. However,
Cartwright J. (Fauteux J. concurring) argued that the legality of
strikes remains to be determined by common law, but that any
breaches of contract (but not torts) are immunized by s. 1(2), which
otherwise would be rendered nugatory, so that striking is a "right
under this Act". It is submitted that it is circular to say that striking
is a s. 58 "right" because s. 1(2) negates breach. The words "For
the purposes of this Act" require the claimant to be exercising a
"right under this Act" as a prerequisite of s. 1(2) status: surely s.
1(2) does not create something upon which it depends for its own
existence!
Further, Cartwright J. thought that s. 1(2) of the Ontario Act
immunized breaches of contract, in which case additional tort
illegalities would stop the strike from being a "right under this
Act". This is a dangerous view. It is a nice question whether
Cartwright J. would have held s. 1(2) to immunize a breach of
contract where the breach was also a component of a tort, or
whether the breach, being a component of the wider tort, would
Common Law Provinces of Canada" in Proceedings of the Fourth International
Symposium on Comparative Law (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1967) at
187. See also R. Dunsmore, "The Employer, the Employee and the Legal Strike"
(1973), 2 Queen's L.J. 3.
23. Text accompanying note 19, supra.
24. (1962), 34 D.L.R. (2d) 654 at 665.
25. Id. at 656-57.
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defeat the immunity. The other judges did not consider the impact
of tort illegalities, though the thrust of their judgments is that
compliance with statutory procedures is all that counts. The effect
of the majority decision is therefore to protect the job interests of
individual strikers but to restrict that protection to interest strikes,
called in accordance with the Ontario Labour Relations Act.
The legislation of all other jurisdictions reserves the protection of
their equivalents of s. 58 of the Ontario Act to lawful strikes, with
terminological variations, 26 and Royal York would therefore appear
to be binding in all jurisdictions. Certain jurisdictions incorporate
the decision in their legislation by gearing protection of individual
job interests in strikes specifically to strikes which comply with
statutory procedures. Thus, Alberta, Nova Scotia and the Canada
Labour Code speak of strikes "... . that are permitted by this Part",
meaning those complying with the requisite procedures.
27
In the "declaratory" equivalent of Ontario's s. 1(2) found in
legislation of most provinces "employee" status is maintained
regardless of the strike being illegal. The object appears to be to
forestall the argument of the employer in Ainscough.28 It is
surprising that the British Columbia and New Brunswick statutes
restrict such protection to "strikes. . . not contrary to this Act" and
"lawful" strikes respectively. Even in those jurisdictions the
legislation could be construed as giving protection unless a strike is
in beach of statutory procedures, and thus not leaving the
individual's position to be determined by the inappropriate notions
of the lawfulness of the strike at common law.
2. When is the Striking Employee Protected?
Strikers' job interests are protected when the employer's principal
reason for dismissal is to penalize them for participating in a lawful
26. Industrial Relations Act, S.N.B. 1971, c. 9, s. 4(3); Labour Act, S.P.E.I.
1971, c. 35 as am. by S.P.E.I. 1973, c. 24, s. 9(1); Labour Code, R.S.C. 1970, c.
L-1, s. 184(3) (a) (vi); Alberta Labour Act, 1973, S.A. 1973, c. 33, s. 153(3);
Trade Union Act, S.N.S. 1972, c. 19, s. 51(3) (vi); Labour Code of British
Columbia Act, S.B.C. 1973, c. 122, s. 3(2); The Labour Relations Act, R.S.N.
1970, c. 191, s. 4(2); The Trade Union Act, 1972, S.S. 1972, c. 137, s. I 1(1) (A);
The Labour Relations Act, S.M. 1972, c. 75, ss. 14(1) (b) ("rights") and 8(1) (b)
and (g) ("rights" and "activities").
27. Trade Union Act, S.N.S. 1972, c. 19; The LabourRelations Act, S.M. 1972,
c. 75. Alberta Labour Act, 1973, S.A. 1973, c. 33; The Labour Relations Act,
R.S.N. 1970, c. 191.
28. (1975), 54 D.L.R. (3d) 1; 75 C.L.L.C. 15, 253.
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strike. The major issue therefore is determining the employer's
motive for dismissal. This issue presents itself differently where the
dismissal occurs in the course of a strike than it does when the
employee is effectively terminated at the end of a strike. Just when
the "end of the strike" occurs is in itself often a difficult issue. The
shortage of case law leaves many questions in these areas
unanswered.
Strikers' jobs may be threatened (a) where they are dismissed
during the strike, and (b) where they are refused reinstatement when
the strike ends, which (c) involves a definitional problem to which
particular attention must be directed.
(a). Dismissal During the Strike
In all Canadian jurisdictions it is an unfair labour practice for an
employer to discharge lawful strikers and compulsory reinstatement
as well as compensation may be ordered. Since the essence of the
offence is the employer's motive he should bear the burden of
proof, otherwise it will be virtually impossible for the employee to
establish bad motive on a "balance of probabilities". Saskatchewan
and Nova Scotia have recognized this by expressly reversing the
burden by placing it on the employer.29 The Nova Scotia reversal is
wider in that it applies to penalties other than dismissal or
suspension, for example, interference with fringe benefits and
threats of discharge or suspension. 30 Other provinces may follow
the traditional Ontario Board practice of making a defacto reversal
where the employer's conduct is so inherently injurious to the
employees' interests, as dismissal is, that it implicitly connotes bad
motive. In Sarich v. Corp. of the City of Sault Ste. Marie3' the
Ontario Board appeared to depart from the traditional policy by
insinuating that the striker carries the onus, but recent decisions
revert to the traditional approach. 32
Particularly difficult issues arise where the employer asserts the
true reason for dismissal to be (i) "legitimate business reasons", or
(ii) misconduct.
29. The Trade Union Act, S.S. 1972, c. 137, s. 11(1) (c); Trade Union Act,
S.N.S. 1972, c. 19, s. 54(3).
30. S.N.S. 1972, c. 19, s. 51(3).
31. [1974]O.L.R. B. Rep. 523.
32. Retail Clerks Int'l. Association v. Little Bros. (Western) Ltd., [1975] O.L.R.
B. Rep. 83 at 84.
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(i) "Legitimate business reasons"
The Ontario Board has held the dismissal of strikers to be lawful
where the employer's principal reason was neither "devoid of
legitimate business purpose or lacking in significant business
purpose". 33 The system recognizes the employer's "right" to
reduce his work force because of adverse economic circumstances,
notwithstanding that this coincides with a strike. However, there
must be safeguards against employers hoodwinking boards by
trumped-up claims of economic adversity.
First, boards should vigorously examine the employer's
economic evidence and if the situation is not so "bleak" that a
"reasonable company" would normally make such cutbacks, bad
motive should be assumed. Second, if the adverse situation is
self-induced, for example, where the employer refuses to take
orders or cuts back on business in other arbitrary ways, bad motive
should be assumed. Third, if the situation "miraculously"
improves after the strike, especially if union activists are not
re-employed, bad motive should be assumed. A conditional board
order may be particularly useful in this context. 34 An example
would be a board order provisionally accepting the employer's
"legitimate reason" at the date of dismissal, but requiring him to
return to the board if jobs subsequently become available and the
strikers are not rehired.
The issue is more complex where the strike either directly or
indirectly creates the adverse economic climate. It is submitted that
where the adverse economic situation is caused by a confluence of
factors, the strike not being the principal one, a dismissal is prima
facie "legitimate". Where the strike is the principal factor the
dismissal should be considered to be because of the strike and to be
primafacie "illegitimate". The industrial relations system does not
contemplate employees injuring their employer without his being
allowed to defend himself. Part of the dynamics of striking is that
the union must gauge how much pressure the firm can withstand
before cutbacks are necessary. To protect against dismissal where
strikers have miscalculated is to let them have their cake and eat it
too. However, since all strikes involve some damage to the firm,
there is a danger of abuse by employers and the above safeguards
should be strictly applied.
33. Webster and Horsfall (Canada) Ltd. (1969), 69 C.L.L.C. 16,050 (O.L.R.B.).
34. E.g. Trade Union Act, S.N.S. 1972, c. 19, s. 17(a).
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Little illumination is provided by the only case to arise, Webster
and Horsfall.3 5 The business was divided into rope wire
manufacturing and import-resale operations. The employer had
decided sometime prior to the strike to close the manufacturing side
(though the strike hastened it) and this evidenced "legitimate
business reasons". However, his attempt to replace one striker in
the import-resale side with a supervisor indicated bad motive since
there was no run down of the import-resale business. The existence
of such a prior decision is a useful indicator but should not, as a rule
of law, excuse employers, because it could easily be abused by an
employer who foresees a strike.
An interesting question is whether it is "legitimate" for
employers to create a loss situation. Suppose an employer dismisses
strikers because he wants a "quiet life" free from labour disputes
and accepts that the reduction of his operations will cost money. His
motive relates to striking, but the system surely contemplates him
determining the scope of his business (though unions would press
for a joint say).
36
(ii) Misconduct
Employers should be allowed to dismiss strikers for certain
misconduct but there must be safeguards against spurious
allegations raised to cloak the employer's true motive. Labour
boards are unlikely to apply common law standards of breach of
contract and repudiation as these do not reflect industrial realities.
Dicta suggest that the employment relationship preserved by the
declaratory sections is a novel status one, not a contractual one, to
which the contract standards are presumably inapplicable.3 7 At the
best they will probably accommodate industrial realities, as where
employees were dismissed for organizing, outside their strict
statutory "right" to participate in union activities.38
One test of employer motive in dismissing strikers is to utilize the
"just cause" standards of grievance arbitration and say that there is
35. (1969), 69 C.L.L.C. 16,050.
36. In practice only firms with unsophisticated technological systems could do
this. American courts probably permit dismissal. See Textile Workers v.
Darlington Co. (1965), 380 U.S. 263 at 273-74.
37. Royal York (1962), 31 D.L.R. (2d) 209 at 219 (Ont. H.C.) (per McRuer
C.J.H.C.); 34 D.L.R. (2d) 654 at 658 (S.C.C.) (per Locke J.) but cf. id., at 666
(per Judson J.). See also, Tung Sol (1964), 15 L.A.C. 161 at 164 (Reville).
38. E.g. USW of America and Rosco Metal Products (1964), 64 C.L.L.C. 16,303
(O.L.R.B.).
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a rebuttable presumption of bad motive if dismissal would not be for
"just cause", the more so where the alleged cause of dismissal falls
patently short of those standards. Even though the collective
agreement will necessarily have terminated where there is a legal
strike it is compatible with legislative policy that "just cause"
standards apply during strikes. Given that legislation performs the
function of the collective agreement during its temporary demise,
and that it assumes a second agreement which will contain a "just
cause" clause, the legislation appears to contemplate the interim
period being governed as far as possible as if a collective agreement
were in force. One formula adopted by arbitrators is to ask whether
the misconduct is ". . . inimical to the continuance of the
employer-employee relationship". 39 This formula, which enables
the arbitrator to accommodate industrial realities, may now be
examined in relation to picketing and sabotage, two problem areas
of striker misconduct.
Dismissal for lawful picketing should be considered to indicate
bad motive because picketing is established as a legitimate weapon
which invariably accompanies strikes. Picketing involving obscure
crimes and torts, short of "serious" illegality, such as violence and
property destruction, should also indicate bad motive. It is
undesirable that job rights depend on esoteric illegalities of which
the worker cannot be expected to know. The normal practice of
polic6 and employers is not to initiate legal process unless
"serious" illegality occurs. 40 Arbitrators have taken account of
mitigating factors like a long, bitter strike causing latent
explosiveness, deliberate provocation, drunkenness, previous
warnings and prior service record.
41
Protection should not apply to those who sabotage a plant, which
is generally condemned and Iknown to be unlawful. However, there
must be safeguards against deliberate employer provocation. In
Inmont Canada42 the striker broke into the factory by stealth and
39. Re Int'l. Chemical Workers, Local 412, and Penick Canada Ltd. (1966), 17
L.A.C. 80 (Hanrahan); Re Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers, Local 9-341, and
Inmont Canada Ltd. (1970), 21 L.A.C. 411 (O'Shea); cf. Re Canadian Gypsum
Co. and N.S. Quarryworkers Union Local 294, CLC (1960), 20 D.L.R. (2d) 319
(N.S.S.C.) (per Parker J.)
40. Arguably pickets should not suffer loss of job even then because adequate
remedies are available under general civil and criminal law to compensate and
exact retribution.
41. Inmont Canada (1970), 21 L.A.C. 411 (O'Shea); cf. Penick Canada (1966),
17 L.A.C. 80 (Hanrahan).
42. Id.
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sabotaged the plant without doing serious damage. Although
dismissal was for "just cause" the arbitrator did not clarify whether
sabotage is ever excusable. Probably the strongest evidence of
explosiveness and provocation is required for discharge not to be for
"just cause''.
(b). Refusal to Reinstate When the Strike Ends
Protection is available under general unfair labour practice
provisions and, in Ontario and Manitoba, under the specific
statutory right to reinstatement.
(i) General unfair labour practice provisions
Refusal to reinstate at the end of a strike is a "... refusal . . . to
continue to employ" so that, in a sense, the right to reinstatement
rests in the reversed burden of proof. Unless the employer
establishes good motive there is an unfair labour practice entitling
the employee to an order of compulsory reinstatement. The
employer might argue that his motive is justifiable because, first,
the system does not contemplate his having to expand his business
to find room for displaced strikers, and, second, that it would be
unfair to replacements who have been hired to displace them. 43 It is
submitted that consistent labour policy requires that this argument
be rejected. 
4 4
The plight of the replacements is a sorry one but not as sorry as
that of strikers who are penalized for participating in action essential
to the working of the system. The risk of displacement is the price
of strike-breaking. If replacements choose to become allies of the
employer they must accept the chance of being hurt. To place their
interests above the strikers' allows for potentially great employer
abuse. Further, the possible escalation of violence in picketing by
strikers who see their jobs threatened by replacements is against the
"public interest".
For strikers' displacement does not normally differ from simple
dismissal. The employer's legitimate interest in continuing to
operate during a strike only implies a right to hire temporary
replacements. 4 5 Employers who have taken all practical steps to
43. The Rand Report, supra, note 14 at 172-78 states that outside replacements
were used in 29.4% of strikes where employers continued operations.
44. Cf. Royal York (1962), 34 D.L.R. (2d) 654 at 657 (per Locke J.).
45. Courts have recognized the employer's right but have not considered whether
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find temporary workers and failed might argue that unless they
could offer permanent jobs they would have to close down during
the strike, but it is submitted that this argument must be rejected.
The possibility of an employer having to close down is simply one
of the variables in the balance of power, which he must consider
before accepting a strike and part of the price he must pay in the
interest of the industrial relations system. The point of balance is a
value judgment and if strikers' legitimate claim to protection
necessitiates closure, so be it! As yet no Canadian cases have been
reported on this precise point.
46
(ii) Special legislation in Ontario and Manitoba
Only in Ontario and Manitoba is there a specific statutory right of
reinstatement irrespective of replacements, and it is a limited right.
Section 11(1) of the Manitoba Act states that an "employee" who
takes part in a lawful strike shall not be refused reinstatement in the
job he held at the beginning of the strike provided: (a) the work he
performed is continued after the strike and (b) a collective
agreement has been reached settling the strike. The order of
reinstatement, if not specified in the collective agreement or "other
agreements",47 shall be in accordance with seniority standing at the
date the strike began. 48 The right is limited in that it only arises
when a collective agreement is reached, which in practice means
when the union has won. This ignores the plight of the defeated
striker and gains nothing for the individual striking employee
because no union could "sell" a package to its membership without
guaranteeing recall!
Another deficiency of the Manitoba Act is s. 11(3) which enables
employers to escape liability by proving that refusal to reinstate was
it stops at temporary replacements. See Christian Labour Association v. McLeod
[1969] O.L.R.B. Rep. 1100 at 1104. Cf. Locke J. in Royal York, id., who
intimates that the right extends to permanent replacement.
46. American courts have adopted the opposite position. NLRB v. MacKay Radio
and Telephone Co. (1938), 304 U.S. 333. See Replacement of Workers During
Strikes (1965-66), 75 Yale L.J. 630; J. Getman, The Protection of Economic
Pressure by Section 7 of the National Labour Relations Act (1966-67), 115 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 1195; G. Schatzki, Some Observations and Suggestions Concerning a
Misnomer- "Protected" Concerted Activities (1969), 47 Texas L. Rev. 378.
47. This appears to erode the supremacy of the collective agreement as the
exclusive code for the unit.
48. Presumably the reference is to seniority as it stood under the previous
collective agreement, although it will in fact have terminated prior to the
commencement of any legal strike.
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for a just cause "which was not related to the strike . . . or any act
in support of the strike". These words appear to preclude dismissal
even for picket violence or "legitihfate business reasons" brought
about by the strike because the requirement is not that the cause of
dismissal related only or necessarily to the strike. This extends
protection beyond the limits of social justification.
Section 64 of the Ontario Act provides that an "employee
engaging" in a lawful strike4 9 who makes an unconditional
application for reinstatement within six months of the commence-
ment of the strike shall be reinstated in his former job on such terms
as the employer and employee may agree upon, "except where
persons are no longer hired to perform work of the same or similar
nature". Section 64 also states that in the event of a "suspension or
discontinuance for cause of the employer's operations, or any part
thereof', if operations are resumed those who have made an
application must be given preferential recall. This goes beyond the
Manitoba "right" in that the statute applies where a collective
agreement has not been reached. This gives protection where it is
needed but there are shortcomings in the Ontario legislation too.
Foremost is the six month limitation which sets the parties a
bargaining deadline. The union knows it must win within the limit
or lose its less militant supporters, and employers are encouraged to
"hang on" knowing their bargaining strength will improve. Strikes
over six months do not necessarily result in a union "defeat" and it
is presumptuous to assume that unions which cannot "win" within
six months are undeserving of their membership's support. Time
limits are arbitrary; realities can only be accommodated by a
flexible standard like "until the strike ends".
A second shortcoming is the requirement that the striker make an
"unconditional" application supported by individual "bargain-
ing". This allows employers to dictate the terms of reinstatement
subject only to the subsection (1) proviso that there must be no
"discrimination" for the employee's exercise of "rights under this
Act". There does not appear to be any requirement that employers
observe terms at least as favourable as in the pre-strike collective
agreement, which means that the price of "going it alone" which
the employer can exact from a returning striker may be very high. It
seems contrary to the spirit of collective bargaining legislation that
49. I.e., before a collective agreement is "executed", Canadian Textile and
Chemical Union v. Artistic Woodwork Co., [1974] O.L.R.B. Rep. 157.
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employers should be allowed to exploit their unequal power over
individuals in this way. It would be better to require reinstatement
on terms not less favourable than in the previous collective
agreement pending their renegotiation in the second collective
agreement.
The third and perhaps most serious shortcoming of the Ontario
Act is that, unlike employers in Manitoba, Ontario employers can
unilaterally determine the order of recall, regardless of seniority,
where there are several applicants and thus punish union militants.
(c). The Duration of the Strike
Obviously special protection for strikers' job interests should only
apply for as long as the strike lasts. The common statutory formula
is to declare that no person ceases to be an employee "by reason
only of his ceasing to work for his employer as the result of a...
strike". There are terminological differences. The legislation of
Ontario, 50 New Brunswick, 51 Manitoba 52 and Prince Edward
Island53 confer employee status "for the purposes of this Act". The
statutes of Nova Scotia,5 Alberta, 55 Newfoundland 56 and the
Canada Labour Code57 substitute the words "within the meaning of
this Act", but there appears to be no practical difference. The
uniquely worded Saskatchewan Act, s. 2(f) (ii) states, "employee
• . . includes any person on strike or lockout in a current industrial
dispute who has not secured permanent employment elsewhere".
Its significance is seen later. Only British Columbia and New
Brunswick restrict the conferring of status to lawful strike
situations, and in British Columbia Ainscough has negated some of
the undesirable consequences. 5
8
This remarkably imprecise formula has not been clarified. One
test of when a person has ceased to be "on strike" and therefore an
employee for statutory purposes was postulated in the Rand Report.
The question to be asked is whether the parties' conduct is
50. The Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 232, s. 1(2).
51. Industrial Relations Act, S.N.B. 1971, c. 9, s. 2(2).
52. The Labour Relations Act, S.M. 1972, c. 75, s. 2(1).
53. Prince Edward Island Labour Act, S.P.E.I. 1971, c. 35, s. 8(2).
54. TradeUnion Act, S.N.S. 1972, c. 19, s. 12(2).
55. Alberta Labour Act, 1973, S.A. 1973, c. 33 Alberta 1973 s. 49(2).
56. The Labour Relations Act, R.S.N. 1970, c. 19 1, s. 2(2).
57. R.S.C. 1970, c. L-1, s. 107(2).
58. (1975), 54 D.L.R. (3d) 1; 75 C.L.L.C. 15, 253.
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"incompatible with the basic purpose of the [labour relations]
legislation", 59 but labour boards avoid these murky waters
wherever possible. Wisely, boards relate the end of the strike to the
circumstances of the individual striker rather than attempting to
ascertain an objective end of the strike itself, as manifested by a
resumption of normal work, for example. Thus in McLeod
60
although the strike lasted over seventeen months and normal
production had been resumed, the Ontario Labour Relations Board
held that eight of the ten strikers had not lost their status as
employees. The other two lost status by taking permanent jobs
elsewhere, not because the strike appeared effectively beaten. Any
other approach is fraught with dangers where normal production is
resumed by replacements. Those who stay out on strike should not
be denied protection whether they number 5% or 95% of the
original work force.61
If some employees were to stay out after a collective agreement
was executed their dismissal would be justified not because the
strike was "ended" but because their strike would then be illegal.
In applying such a test certain circumstances clearly negate
employee status, such as death, resumption of work, formal
resignation, contracting a disease disenabling further work,
dismissal which does not constitute an unfair labour practice. The
areas of greatest difficulty are where (i) the striker takes
employment elsewhere, and (ii) replacements are hired.
(i) The striker takes employment elsewhere
It is established that temporary "moonlighting" is compatible with
a continuing relationship and does not terminate status. 62 The Rand
59. The Rand Report, supra, note 14. A similar approach was adopted in Re
Allanson (1971), 17 D.L.R. (3d) 531 (Ont. H.C.), affd (1971), 20 D.L.R. (3d) 49
(Ont. C.A.), and underlies the dicta of McRuer C.J.H.C. in Royal York (1962), 31
D.L.R. (2d) 209 at 220 (Ont. H.C.) and in McLeod, [1969] O.L.R.B. Rep. 1100 at
1104. In Re Allanson, (1971), 20 D.L.R. (3d) 49 at 57, Arnup J.A. in the Court of
Appeal intimated that strikers who have "retired" retain status. This is incorrect, it
is submitted.
60. [1969]O.L.R.B. Rep. 1100.
61. The number of strikers must not fall below two because otherwise there will
cease to be a "strike" within the statutory definitions. This leads to odd
conclusions. For example, in a strike of three if one dies and the other quits, the
remaining striker is unprotected.
62. McLeod, [1969] O.L.R.B. Rep. 1100 at 1105; Beck and International
Brotherhood of Bookbinders, Local 28 (1974), 74 C.L.L.C. 16,087 (O.L.R.B.).
See the Rand Report, supra, note 14 at 23, 25 and 27.
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Report recommended (reluctantly, one suspects) that this be law,
and justified it on the ground that temporary "moonlighting" is
equivalent in the balance of power to the employer's right to hire
temporary replacements. This is a questionable notion because the
variables affecting the balance are too diverse for one to be isolated
as the exact equivalent to the other.
In determining whether the new job is "temporary" the test
should be the striker's subjective intention. This does not mean that
his testimony is conclusive. The onus of proof is, after all, on the
striker to establish "employee" status as part of his unfair labour
practice charge so that doubts as to the temporary nature of
alternative employment are resolved against him.63 Objective
manifestations of his intent, no less than his credibility under
cross-examination, are relevant as proof, but the legal standard
should be his intent.
Relevant objective manifestations of intent include the relation-
ship between striker and struck employer which indicates temporary
employment, as where the employer pays vacations as they fall
due, 64 or otherwise treats the striker as an employee for purposes of
fringe benefits. Little reliance should be placed on statements to the
second employer that the job is permanent for the striker may have
to lie to get it. It is also relevant whether the striker has conducted
himself as a permanent employee of the second employer, such as
by accepting lengthy layoffs without changing jobs. 65 Overt "strike
activities" such as picketing and maintaining contacts with the
employer, the union and workmates, though emphasized in Beck, 
66
are dangerous measures since many true strikers will show little
interest whereas those who have left may remain active out of
revenge or loyalty to ex-workmates. Finally, the nature of the
second job would appear to be relevant. For example, a striking
draftsman who took employment as a "bouncer" should not be
readily assumed to have taken permanent employment.
(ii) Replacements are hired
In Royal York Locke J. may be interpreted as implying that the
hiring of replacements terminates "employee" status on the ground
63. This is the effect of dicta in McLeod, id. at 1105 and Beck, 74 C.L.L.C. at
para. 14.
64. As in McLeod, id.
65. As inBeck (1974), 74 C.L.L.C. 16,087.
66. Id. atpara. 15.
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that work has ceased because of something other than a strike,
namely that replacements have taken over the jobs. 67 This seems
incorrect since replacements may be regarded as increasing the
numbers of the workforce rather than as substitutes for the strikers.
In McLeod 68 replacements were considered relevant in establishing
that the employer did not have an anti-union motive, but irrelevant
for the purpose of determining if the strikers had employee status.
V. Protection of Fringe Benefits
In considering the vulnerability of strikers to loss of their
entitlement to fringe benefits attention is here focused on pensions,
seniority, holidays, vacations and sick pay. The legal protection
afforded by statute or perhaps by any renewed collective agreement
is considered in the case of each of these fringe benefits in turn.
Finally, the notion of "incorporation" of rights arising under
collective agreements into the private contract of employment is
considered in this context. The question is whether the individual
employee who has participated in a losing strike can rely on his
individual contract of employment to claim fringe benefits
established under a collective agreement which has terminated.
1. Pensions
The employer's obligation to continue paying into a pension fund
arises from the collective agreement and therefore ceases upon its
expiry. 69 Further, given the theory that most pensions are contracts
subject to the condition that the employee continue in service until a
future "vesting" date, employees are generally not entitled to any
benefits. Nor, if the strike occurs before "vesting", are employees
entitled to recover any part of the employer's contributions (unjust
enrichment might be raised as an argument) although they probably
can recover their own. 7
0
Penalizing strikers in respect to non-vested pension benefits may
be an unfair labour practice contrary to the prohibition against
discrimination "in regard to any term or condition of employment"
67. Royal York (1962), 34 D.L.R. (2d) 654 at 657 (S.C.C.).
68. [196910.L.R.B. Rep. 1100at 1104-5.
69. Re Coulter Manufacturing Ltd. and UAW, Local 222 (1973), 1 L.A.C. (2d)
426 at 430 (Weatherhill).
70. Generally, see J. Fichaud, Pensions: A Primer for Lawyers (1975), 2
Dalhousie L.J. 369.
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in s. 58(a) of the Ontario Act and its counterparts. However, there
can be no liability if all employees are penalized equally and no
cases have arisen so far.
In six Canadian jurisdictions it is specifically made an unfair
labour practice to deprive lawful strikers of pension benefits. The
Canada Labour Code, s. 184(3) (d), is typical, providing that no
employer shall
• . . deny to any employee any pension rights or benefits to
which the employee would be entitled but for (i) the cessation of
work.. . as the result of a ... strike not prohibited by this Part.
It is submitted that "or benefits" refers to "pension benefits" not
to other "benefits" such as seniority. A pension "right" is not the
same as a pension "benefit". The former connotes a "vested"
pension whereas the latter refers to accrued but non-vested benefits.
The Saskatchewan Act, s. 11(1) (1) (ii), protects all benefits by
referring to "pension rights or benefits or any benefit whatsoever."
Striking can affect the accrual of benefits under schemes that are
preserved after the strike. If benefits accrue with "time worked"
strike periods do not count unless the worker makes up the full
contributions. 71 If they accrue with "continuous employment" time
on strike should be counted since the employment relationship is
preserved throughout, although employers should not have to make
up their contributions unless the scheme so provides.
The "freeze" provisions of Canadian labour relations statutes
preclude unilateral "alteration''72 of terms and conditions of
employment by an employer or union until the peace procedures
have been exhausted. 73 One way to protect pension benefits and
other fringe benefits would be by extending the "freeze" until the
execution of a second collective agreement. Strikers' benefits would
then be protected unless the union was forced to accept loss or
reduction of benefits in the new collective agreement. The "freeze"
would, of course, have to be a modified one so that there would be
no continuing obligation to pay wages.
71. See Re UAW Local 397 and Norton of Canada Ltd. (1969), 20 L.A.C. 195
(Brown). This was an absence case, though the principle would be the same as in
strikes.
72. There is no "alternation" if the change is part of a past pattern so that it
"would have happened anyway": United Radio, Electrical and Machine Workers
v. Beaver Electronics Ltd., [1974] O.L.R.B. Rep. 120. This, of course, is open to
abuse.
73. E.g. The Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 232, s. 70(1).
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2. Seniority
No province specifically protects the seniority of strikers other than
by general unfair labour practice provisions. As mentioned above,
the Saskatchewan Act by s. 11(1) (1) (ii) does preclude changes in
"any other benefit whatsoever" because an employee exercises
rights under the Act but does not appear effective to prevent
employers from disregarding seniority.
However, generally time on strike is to be counted in the
computation of seniority under any new collective agreement
subsequent to the strike. Arbitrators regard this as important to
employees, holding that only "very clear" 74 language will allow
strike periods to be discounted.
3. Holidays
Holidays may be provided in the collective agreement or under
"floor of rights" legislation and it would appear that striking
employees may lose holidays in three ways: (i) where the employer
withdraws such non-vested benefits after the agreement ends; (ii) by
strikers not having "employee" status at the date of the holiday, a
common requirement in agreements; (iii) by the "day before - day
after" rule common to agreements.
Holidays have been held to "vest" in one arbitration case 75 so
that they are enforceable by trust after the expiry of the collective
agreement. The arbitrator solved the problem of how much work
was needed for the holiday to "vest" by requiring the employee to
work his last shift after the last preceding holiday provided for in the
agreement. If this decision is correct, the withdrawl of the holiday
benefit would be unlawful. However, payment for a holiday
normally depends on the employee working both the shift preceding
and the shift following the holiday. If there is a strike on one or both
of these days, and the agreement states them to be normal working
days, the holiday will be lost.
76
74. TungSol (1964), 15 L.A.C. 161 at 162, 164-65.
75. Re TCF of Canada and Textile Workers' Union of America, Local 1332
(1973), 1 L.A.C. (2d) 382 at 384 (Adell). "Vesting" would be impossible under
the indemnity explanation of holidays. E.g. Re Sudbury General Workers' Union,
Local 902 and Silverman and Sons (1967), 18 L.A.C. 224 (Weiler).
76. The words of the agreement are important and may vary. See Re USW, Local
6299, and American-Standard Products Ltd. (1968), 20 L.A.C. 18 (Palmer);
USW, Local 5656, and Hilton Mines Ltd. (1967), 18 L.A.C. 211 (Lalande).
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A common feature of legislation providing for minimum holidays
is that striking does not necessarily disentitle workers. For instance,
in Ontario, strikers would only be disentitled if the strike lasted
longer than twelve "working days" during the thirty "calendar
days" immediately preceding the holiday. 77 The Ontario legislation
also has a "day before - day after" rule78 similar to that found in
most collective agreements. Unlike Ontario, Nova Scotia disentitles
employees engaged in "continuous operations" who refuse to work
on a holiday when directed by their employer.79
4. Vacations
For an employer to unilaterally postpone vacations falling due
during a strike might constitute an unfair labour practice if the time
of the vacations had been fixed by some binding agreement. This
would be unlikely, however, since the collective agreement would
normally be the vehicle for such an agreement and would have
terminated prior to any legal strike. Where the employer has the
right to unilaterally fix vacation times, failure to grant a vacation
would, of course, be unexceptionable. In any case vacation pay is
"deferred wages" that would have been earned up to the time of the
strike. If there is a new agreement following a strike it has been held
that the strike period counts toward the accrual of the next vacation
unless the agreement states otherwise.8 0
Under legislation providing for minimum vacations striking
would not ipso facto negative vacation rights but would affect the
amount of vacation pay where it is calculated by work actually
performed. 81
5. Sick pay
The expiry of the collective agreement has been held to permit
77. The Employment Standards Act, 1974, S.O. 1974, c. 112, s.26(1) (b). See
also, for example, the Labour Standards Code, S.N.S. 1972, c. 10, s. 40(I) (a).
78. Section 26(1) (c).
79. Sections 39(1) and 40(3).
80. Re Sudbury Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, Local 598, and Falconbridge
Nickel Mines (1971), 22 L.A.C. 243 (Weiler) where vacation rights were based on
a "working year", but see Re USW and Welmet Inds. (1969), 20 L.A.C. 431
(Weatherhill) where vacation rights were based on "active employment".
81. E.g. in Ontario, the amount of payment must not be less than 4% of the
employee's earnings in the preceding twelve month period so that absence on strike
decreases the amount of vacation pay.
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employers to disentitle strikers from accrued benefits.8 2 This could
work real hardship in a case of accumulated sick benefits intended
to afford a long-serving worker a large number of sick days to cover
the long illnesses that become more likely with advancing age.
Where there is a new collective agreement an employee who was
still off sick at the time of the signing of the new agreement would
undoubtedly be covered but strikers are probably not entitled to
payment for illness coinciding with the strike unless the agreement
states otherwise. The traditional function of sick pay is to insure
against work lost through illness, not through strikes. Since the
striker would not have worked anyway, he will have suffered no
additional loss by being ill. Workers have been disentitled on this
ground where illness coincided with lay-off, 83 but the point remains
open with regard to strikes.
6. Severance pay
The Ontario Divisional Court has recently rejected the notion that
severance benefits "vest" so as to be enforceable as "property"
interests through trust after the collective agreement expires. 84 This
accords with the terminology of most schemes which is inconsistent
with trust.
The common feature of legislation8 5 providing for severance
benefits is that such benefits are not payable where closure is caused
by a labour dispute.86 However, a recent Ontario employment
standards determination has held87 that severance benefits under the
Employment Standards Act do not apply where closure coincides
with a strike on the ground that the words ". . . a person who has
been employed for three months or more" 88 at the date of closure
82. IUOE, Local 700, and City of Hamilton (1963), 13 L.A.C. 235 (Reville).
83. See Re Price (Nfld.) Pulp and Paper Ltd. and International Brotherhood of
Pulp, Sulphite and Papermill Workers, Local 63 (1973), 1 L.A.C. (2d) 69 (Harris).
84. Re Telegram Publishing Co. and Zwelling, [1974] 1 O.R. (2d) 592 (H.C.).
85. All provinces save British Columbia and New Brunswick provide statutory
minimum notice requirements for layoff (or wages in lieu) and minimum severance
payments.
86. Termination of Employment Regulations, R.R.O. 1970, Reg. 251, s. 3.
87. Re Telegram Publishing Co. and William Cornish (1973), 1 L.A.C. (2d) 29
(Carter).
88. Employment Standards Act, R.S.O. 1970, s.13(1). (Now see s.40(1), S.O.
1974, c. 112, where "employee" has been substituted for "person".) Re Allanson
(1971), 17 D.L.R. (3d) 531, where "employee" status under s. 1(2) of the Ontario
Labour Relations Act was held to apply as a non-Act purpose, i.e. a private pension
scheme.
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contemplates an earning relationship, not "employee" status under
s. 1(2) of the Labour Relations Act. This decision neither concurs
with the wording nor the policy of the Act. The purpose of s. 2(d) of
the Regulations which disentitles those laid-off or terminated "...
during or as a result of a strike ... at his place of employment" is
to cover lay-offs either caused by the workers in question striking or
by strikes of their colleagues, not to impose a blanket disentitlement
every time a strike coincides with a redundancy situation. Otherwise
employers, planning redundancies, could provoke stoppages so as
to drive a coach and four through the Act! Rather, strikers compete
with wage earners in the same labour market and therefore equally
need the Act's protection. The fact that s. l(c) uses "has been",
suggesting that the qualifying period may be worked before the
strike, and that the length of "advance notice" is based on the
number of persons laid-off rather than length of service, makes the
decision a surprising one.
7. The Incorporation Theory: a Residual Common Law Element.
The traditional form of the incorporation theory89 is that certain
provisions of the collective agreement are incorporated during its
currency into the private employment contracts of those bound by
the collective agreement and remain enforceable as part of the
private contract of employment of each of them after the collective
agreement ends. The Supreme Count of Canada decision in
Ainscough90 casts grave doubt on the validity of this approach.
Laskin C.J.C. held that the private contract of employment does not
co-exist with the collective agreement and it would appear to follow
that the collective agreement provisions not be incorporated into
anything during the currency of the collective agreement. This does
not prevent incorporation after the collective agreement ends, by
the parties expressly or impliedly "referring back" to it as the
source of employment conditions to clothe the bare work/wage
bargain which is all that remains after the expiry of both the
collective agreement and the provisions of the applicable labour
relations statute which "freezes" wages and working conditions
until a strike becomes legal. 91 On this theory incorporated terms can
89. See B. Adell, The Legal Status of Collective Agreements in England, the
United States and Canada (Ontario: Queen's University Industrial Relations
Center, 1970) at 203-27.
90. (1975), 54D.L.R. (3d) 1; 75 C.L.L.C. 15,253.
91. Incorporation by "reference back" was contemplated by Fraser J. in Re
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outlive the terminal date of the collective agreement, 92 but it is
submitted nevertheless that the incorporation theory should be
rejected.
The major drawback of the theory is that it is ineffective without a
doctrine of suspension. The "employee" status of lawful strikers
under labour relations legislation, whilst it parallels common law
suspension, arguably only does so for the specific statutory
purposes. 93 Otherwise, the English experience suggests that
suspension at common law is exceptional. 94 Indeed, there are good
reasons for Canadian courts not including the incorporation theory
within the statutory purposes. The thrust of Canadian collective
bargaining legislation is to exclude common law technicalities from
the statutory framework, 95 whereas incorporation infuses a
minefield of uncertainties into it. For instance, it is doubtful that a
grievance procedure is suitable for incorporation from a collective
agreement as a term of an employment contract 96 which would
mean that there is no machinery for enforcing other incorporated
provisions, unless courts usurp the arbitrators' function (which they
seem reluctant to do). 97 Indeed, it would appear to offend privity
Telegram Publishing Co. Ltd. and Zwelling, [1974] 1 O.R. (2d) 592 at 622, 624.
92. See Denis v. Galway Realty, [1973] 3 O.R. 15 (Co. Ct.). Cf. Ferguson v. Bd.
of Education for the City of Toronto, [1972] 3 O.R. 587 (H.C.).
93. Cf. ReAllanson (1971), 17 D.L.R. (3d) 531.
94. Supra at 441-42.
95. This is the thrust of Royal York, supra, note 21 and Ainscough (1975), 54
D.L.R. (3d) 1; 75 C.L.L.C. 15,253.
96. In Re Telegram Publishing Co. Ltd. and Zwelling, [1974] 1 O.R. (2d) 592,
Fraser J. held that collective agreement provisions that do not "directly relate" to
the individual employment relationship are unsuitable for incorporation. The only
case in favour of incorporation is Re Prince Rupert Fishermen's Co-op. Assoc.
(1968), 68 C.L.L.C. 14,079 (B.C.S.C.), disapproved in Zwelling. American
courts do not favour its incorporation: Procter & Gamble Ind. v. Procter & Gamble
Mfg. Co. (1962), 312 F 2d 181 at 184-85. For the English position see K. W.
Wedderburn, The Worker and the Law (2d ed. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971) at
193-96.
97. E.g. The Rights of Labour Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 416, s. 3(3), the policy of
which underlies Hamilton Street Railway Co. v. Northcott (1966), 58 D.L.R. (2d)
708 (S.C.C.); Close v. Globe and Mail (1967), 60 D.L.R. (2d) 105 (Ont. C.A.);
Tkach v. Comstock Int'l. Ltd. Allied Hydro Council of Manitoba (1973), 36
D.L.R. (3d) 626 (Man. Q.B.); Acadia Pulp and Paper Ltd. v. Int'l. Brotherhood of
Pulp, Sulphite and Papermill Workers (1971), 15 D.L.R. (3d) 227 (N.B.S.C.,
Q.B.); Cummings v. Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario (1966), 54
D.L.R. (2d) 583 (Ont. H.C.); Shank v. KVP Co., [1966] 2 O.R. 847 (H.C.) (per
Brooke J.); Drogt v. Robson-Lang Leathers Ltd., [1971] 3 O.R. 488 (Co. Ct.);
Ford v. Trustees of Ottawa Civic Hospital, [1973] 3 O.R. 437 (H.C.) (per
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that a union which is not party to the employment contract, but
without whose co-operation the grievance procedure is inoperable,
be obliged to co-operate. It is improbable that courts would imply a
term in the contract of union membership that the union consents to
process such grievances because of the difficulties involved.
98
Further, lawyers would have a field day in arguing whether there
has been an implied "reference back". (Express "reference back"
is rare since employers- are unwilling to relinquish bargaining
weapons with a strike imminent). Whereas the minimum flesh and
blood clothing the contractual nexus upon expiry of the collective
agreement "freeze" could be the fundamental provisions on wages
and hours under which work is continued, it is more debatable in
which circumstances the less commonplace provisions on seniority,
sickness, severance, holidays and pensions could be said to have
been impliedly incorporated. Presumably no implied "reference
back" would be possible if an employer unilaterally dictates fresh
terms without any work interceding after the expiry of the collective
agreement/"freeze"; so too if an employer simply declared terms of
employment to be subject to negotiation. Clearly implied
''reference back" is inapplicable where the strike coincides with the
expiry of the agreement/"freeze" without any interceding work.
For these reasons it is inadvisable for Canadian courts to develop a
suspension doctrine for the purpose of reinforcing the incorporation
theory.
VI. Conclusion
All provinces have accepted the social justification of protecting the
fringe benefits and jobs of strikers, thereby assisting the growth of
sound collective bargaining in areas of union weakness, provided
that the strike in question is essential to the functioning of the
Leiff J.). Cf. Adcock v. Algoma Steel Corp. (1968), 70 D.L.R. (2d) 246 (per Grant
J.); Re Grottole and Lock (1963), 39 D.L.R. (2d) 128 (Ont. H.C.); Fergusson
v. B'd of Education for City of Toronto, [1972] 3 O.R. 587 (H.C.); Woods v.
Miramichi Hospital (1967), 59 D.L.R. (2d) 290 (N.B.S.C.); Logan v. Board of
School Trustees (1974), 40 D.L.R. (3d) 152 (N.B.S.C., A.D.). See the Court's
wide power to interfere under the B.C. Labour Code, s. 108(b), e.g. Valley
Rite-Mix v. Teamsters Local Union 213" [1975]1 W.W.R. 685 (B.C.C.A.).
98. For example, non-unionists would presumably be unprotected and courts
would surely wish to avoid entangling themselves in union rule books. Further, to
incorporate the procedure assumes the employee has the right to unilaterally
activate it which denies the union's interest in "screening" disputes and
over-extends the duty of fair representation.
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industrial relations system in the sense of being lawful under labour
relations legislation. This is achieved by legislation conferring
"employee" status on lawful and unlawful strikers (the latter
secured by Ainscough99) and making it an unfair labour practice to
dismiss them or to discriminate against them in regard to terms and
conditions of employment because -they strike. Also, certain
provinces have reinforced protection by additional specific unfair
labour practices. The following recommendations are suggested for
the administration of the law relating to dismissal and fringe
benefits.
Dismissal
1. Because motive determines liability, labour relations boards in
provinces not having a statutory reversal of the onus of proof,
should follow the Ontario board practice of operating a de facto
reversal in cases of dismissal.
2. The safeguards of requiring strong economic evidence and of the
conditional order should be utilized to forestall employer abuse of
the "legitimate business reasons" proviso.
3. Where misconduct is alleged to be the principal reason for
.dismissal, boards should accommodate industrial realities by
analogising with the standards of "just cause" in grievance
arbitration. In particular, unlawful picketing should not warrant
dismissal unless "serious" illegality is involved, and even then
there may be mitigating factors.
4. Hiring replacements should not justify dismissal even though
only permanent ones are available so that the employer has to close
down. This could be achieved by legislative provision of a right to
reinstatement, but those should not be modelled on the defective
provisions in Ontario and Manitoba.
5. In determining the duration of strikes, attention should be
focused on the circumstances of the individual strikers, not on the
objective "death" of the strike itself. In particular, where strikers
"moonlight" strong evidence that the second job is intended to be
permanent should be required.
Fringe benefits
The general unfair labour practice against "discrimination" in
99. (1975), 54 D.L.R. (3d) 1; 75 C.L.L.C. 15, 253.
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regard to terms and conditions of employment is defective where all
strikers are penalized. One alternative is to have an unfair labour
practice geared to specific fringe benefits as six jurisdictions already
have in respect to pensions. Another is to extend a modified
statutory "freeze" pending the execution of the second collective
agreement. The incorporation theory, it is submitted, should be
rejected as being inconsistent with the statutory framework of
collective bargaining and because it creates a minefield of
uncertainties.
